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Since identifi cation of command-
following is so crucial for diagnosis 
and care of patients in vegetative 
and minimally conscious states, the 
importance of thoroughly vetted, 
transparent methods cannot be 
overstated.
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wander”, rather than complete the 
imagery tasks. As we reported, no 
positive EEG outcomes occurred 
under these conditions. By contrast, 
75% of these participants were able 
to return signifi cantly classifi able 
EEG data when actually following 
the com mands. In short, the data 
show that random EEG fl uctuations 
(by any known or unknown variable) 
were not suffi  cient to return a single, 
signifi cant classifi cation.
Third, Goldfi ne and colleagues 
argue, reasonably, that a 500 ms 
baseline might be insuffi  cient for 
comparison with an action period of 
3 s. Accordingly, we have rerun our 
analyses, comparing the 500-ms-
wide “baseline” time window before 
the tone (–500 ms to 0 ms) with an 
equal-sized time window beginning 
1 s after the tone (ie, far beyond any 
possible “stimulus-linked startle”, of 
the sort described by Goldfi ne and 
colleagues2). That is to say, exactly 
the same number of band-power 
values are entered into the analyses 
at pre-tone and post-tone time-
points. The results were unchanged; 
as we reported in the paper, the same 
three patients in the vegetative state 
returned signifi cant classifi cation 
values in the post-tone window, but 
non-signifi cant classifi  cation values 
in the pre-tone window—confi rming 
that they were, indeed, following 
commands.
We declare that we have no confl icts of interest.
*Damian Cruse, Srivas Chennu, 
Camille Chatelle, 
Tristan A Bekinschtein, 
Davinia Fernández-Espejo, 
John D Pickard, Steven Laureys, 
Adrian M Owen
dcruse@uwo.ca
Brain and Mind Institute, University of Western 
Ontario, London, ON N6A 5B7, Canada (DC, DF-E, 
AMO); Medical Research Council Cognition and 
Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK (DC, TAB, AMO); 
Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, UK (SC); Coma Science 
Group, Cyclotron Research Centre & Neurology 
Department, University and University Hospital of 
Liège, Liège, Belgium (CC, SL); and Division of 
Academic Neurosurgery, Addenbrooke’s Hospital, 
Cambridge, UK (JDP)
Disorders of conscious ness are at a 
historic epistemological junction: 
those who think like Damian Cruse 
and colleagues1 continue to search 
within the vegetative state for 
evidence of misdiagnosis. However, 
we believe that, when a pathological 
state presents itself, we must research 
its treatment and prognosis rather 
than striving to search for a diff erent 
diagnosis. To try to disprove the 
diagnosis of the vegetative state is 
like appearing during a liver transplant 
with evidence that the diseased 
liver in reality still works, albeit only 
partly. Cruse and colleagues persist 
in the assertion that many diagnoses 
are wrong and that the incidence of 
vegetative state is overestimated 
compared with minimally conscious 
state. For us, this is the obvious 
natural consequence of the fact that 
diff erences between vegetative and 
minimally conscious states have not 
yet been categorised in many of the 
protocols for diagnosis and treatment 
used by health systems worldwide.
Finding unexpected signs of 
consciousness simply means changing 
the diagnosis from vegetative state 
to locked-in syndrome. It means that 
consciousness was not evident on 
clinical examination, but has come 
to light through paraclinical testing. 
In our view, the most sensible thing 
to do is to approach disorders of 
conscious ness as neurologists rather 
than instrumentalists and to develop 
reliable prognostic methods, validated 
on cohorts of an ever-increasing 
number of patients.2 We must also 
acknowledge the overlap between 
locked-in syndrome and vegetative 
state: a necessity which we have 
emphasised on many occasions.3,4
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Authors’ reply
Andrew Goldfi ne and colleagues make 
three comments about our paper. 
First, they imply that we do not use 
“power” as features in our analyses. In 
the Methods section1 we clearly stated 
that we used power values as features, 
in line with many published studies on 
motor imagery and the contemporary 
brain–computer interface.
Second, they argue that an 
unspecifi ed factor could have covaried 
in time with our randomly varying 
task structure, leading to reliable, 
yet erroneous, classifi cation. In fact, 
randomisation is used in task design 
specifi cally to preclude conditions 
under which such covariation could 
occur. Indeed, in our paper we report 
data from healthy controls who 
were asked simply to listen to the 
same task instructions and “mind-
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